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Judge Arnold and Individual Rights
Patricia M. Wald*
Given limits on time and space, this is a kaleidoscopic piece,
selective observations by a fellow judge on a dozen or so individ-
ual rights cases written by Richard Arnold over a fifteen-year
period. Undoubtedly, I have missed some worthy ones, and
make no pretense at comprehensiveness. I have known Dick Ar-
nold for just about as long as he has served on the Eighth Cir-
cuit, and have had the good fortune to work with him on a
number of judicial projects. Unfortunately, like so many of my
colleagues on the bench, I only have time to fully read the opin-
ions from my own circuit and the Supreme Court; other circuits'
work product swims into view only occasionally while research-
ing one's own cases, or brushes by with the wind of notoriety.
Reading an Arnold's dozen in the assigned field of individual
rights, however, has taught me much about the judge and the
man that I did not know from our work together at the United
States Judicial Conference, various circuit conferences, and the
American Law Institute. Opinion-reading may be a lost art,
which is too bad, because those in the press or academia who
canonize or criticize judges based on events of their past lives or
their present reputations would often be better informed-even
surprised-to read those judges' opinions. A final caveat: even
a more thorough reviewer than I proceeds cautiously in drawing
conclusions about a judge's philosophy midstream in his career.
Dick Arnold is an intellect on the move: his migration has car-
ried him from the "Mansion" in Little Rock where he served as
secretary to the Governor; to Washington, D.C. as chief legisla-
tive aide to Senator Dale Bumpers; back to Arkansas as a
United States district judge; and finally, to the role of judge and
chief judge of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. Judge Ar-
nold's progression has been stunning-he surely has many more
miles to go.
Initially, let me say that I was impressed by the variety and
immediacy of the individual rights opinions that Judge Arnold
* Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit.
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has authored. I should not have been. We in Washington are
often seduced by the aura of power that hangs over this city into
believing that our courts have a special lien on important issues
affecting the vital center of our society. Not so. The issues that
vex and contort our vast nation are just as likely to arise in the
heartland-and the Eighth Circuit, spanning Arkansas, Minne-
sota, Nebraska, the Dakotas, Iowa, and Missouri, is certainly
that-as on Constitution Avenue. The following sampling of
Judge Arnold's cases indeed represents a microcosm of the burn-
ing issues of civil liberties and rights in the 1980s, and illus-
trates the role of a federal appellate judge in striking the
eternally delicate balance that the Constitution commands be-
tween the government and the individual.
I. SECTION 1983
A. PRO SE PETITIONS
Pro se petitions, particularly from prisoners, provide one of
the staples of federal district court fare nationwide. Indeed,
judges at both the district and appellate court levels often feel
they are choking on them. Prisoners filed over 1,000 petitions in
the Eighth Circuit in the twelve months ending on June 30,
1991.1 From experience in the D.C. Circuit, I know how real the
incentive is for volume-besieged district judges to dismiss them
summarily-especially the uncounselled ones-quickly, deci-
sively, often without explanation. The chance that in that pile of
stained, thumbprinted, outsized paper petitions lurks another
Gideon v. Wainwright2 is admittedly infinitesimal. Fastidious
appellate judges who insist that every pro se defendant be ac-
corded all procedural rights in a meticulous fashion, as well as
that pro se petitions be construed generously in deciding
whether they state a cause of action,3 are often deemed obstruc-
tionists and spendthrifts in an overwhelmed system.4
Judge Arnold appears fearlessly to face the charge. I found
several cases in which he overturned district court dismissals of
prisoner and arrestee pro se petitions, sometimes over the dis-
1. ADmIRNISTATVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, 1991 ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 182 (1991).
2. 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (establishing that states must provide counsel for
felony defendants).
3. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam).
4. See, e.g., Ketchum v. City of West Memphis, 974 F.2d 81, 84 (8th Cir.
1992) (Fagg, J., dissenting).
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sent of a colleague. 5 What is even more intriguing is that he
never hesitated, even where the vehicle at hand was unprepos-
sessing, to insist on honoring a constitutional right. In Ketchum
v. City of West Memphis,6 a transient complained that the police
had apprehended him for loitering in West Memphis, Arkansas,
and told him to walk across the bridge to Memphis, Tennessee.7
When he refused (he had a broken toe, it turned out), the West
Memphis police picked him up bodily, hauled him against his
will into the neighboring state, and unceremoniously dumped
him at a car wash in Memphis. 8 Reading his cryptic complaint
"with... indulgence," 9 Judge Arnold found that it did indeed
state a constitutional claim with sufficient particularity to with-
stand a motion to dismiss:
The nature of our federal system presupposes a right to travel from
state to state, and states may not prohibit such travel. This federal
right includes "'the freedom to enter and abide in any State in the
Union.'" If Ketchum, while in Arkansas, committed a crime, he was of
course subject to arrest and prosecution. But neither the state nor its
political subdivisions had a right to banish or exile him to Tennes-
see.... Thus, it was error for the District Court to dismiss this com-
plaint for failure to state a claim. 10
His dissenting colleague took a more hardened tack. Keep-
ing the case on the federal court docket "merely encourages
spite-based litigation and trivializes the Constitution," he
said." The district court did well to dismiss this "tattered
case."'12
All federal judges recognize the dilemma. Similar ill-
pleaded petitions-mostly from prisoners-flood our district
courts. Only a handful may contain a kernel of constitutional
wrong. Without astute counsel, plaintiffs cannot possibly know
how to frame their claims or even how to tell if their cases pres-
ent facts to support claims. The injury is often small-being
5. See id.; Thompson v. Housewright, 741 F.2d 213 (8th Cir. 1984); Horsey
v. Asher, 741 F.2d 209 (8th Cir. 1984).
6. 974 F.2d 81 (8th Cir. 1992).
7. Id. at 82-83.
8. Id. at 83.
9. Id. at 82.
10. Id. at 83 (citation omitted) (quoting Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330,
338 (1972), quoting Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 285 (1970)). Recognizing
the burden thrust on a pro se plaintiff mounting a constitutional case, Arnold
added, "[o]n remand, Ketchum will be at liberty to move for appointment of
counsel, and we ask the District Court to consider this motion carefully, if it is
made." Id.
11. Id. at 84 (Fagg, J., dissenting).
12. Id.
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dumped in a car wash is not life-threatening or even irreparable.
A harried or weary appellate reviewer can readily conclude in
almost any untutored petition that the plaintiff has not pleaded
with sufficient particularity a constitutional claim. In Ketchum,
the city based its defense on that assumption. 13 Judge Arnold-
and the dissenting judge too, for that matter-seemed to recog-
nize in the petition the time-honored technique of rural (and ap-
parently suburban) police of briskly escorting an undesirable out
of town.14 Identifying that practice as a basic violation of the
constitutional right to go and stay where one pleases as long as
no crime is committed required a reviewing judge not only to
shake loose the core of the petition, but to shake up a status quo
in police practices. I am sure Ketchum's case had a barely audi-
ble cheering section in the police precincts of Little Rock or else-
where, but it said a good deal about Judge Arnold's refusal to
ignore constitutional violations committed on the most down-
trodden segment of our population.15
Compassion in Judge Arnold was noticeable early in his ju-
dicial career, along with a persistent, ornery refusal to rely on
hyper-technicalities to dismiss individual rights claims with un-
comfortable consequences. In 1984, he reversed a district court
for not supplying a full state court trial transcript to a habeas
corpus petitioner attempting to show that he had not been given
effective assistance of counsel at trial.16 The district court had
been willing to provide only the portion of the transcript that
related to whether counsel had told the prisoner of his right to
appeal,' 7 the failure of such notice being the petitioner's main
grievance. After reading the petition and surrounding docu-
ments, however, again "with indulgence,"' 8 Arnold concluded
that the prisoner's complaint presented other issues.' 9 The peti-
tioner was in fact contesting all aspects of counsel's perform-
ance, including her failure to cross-examine key prosecution
13. See id. at 82.
14. Id. at 84 & n.1 (Fagg, J., dissenting).
15. Of course, Judge Arnold also has dismissed his share of prisoner com-
plaints that did not meet the constitutional threshold. See, e.g., McDowell v.
Jones, 990 F.2d 433, 434 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding, inter alia, that verbal threats
and name calling was not addressable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and that access
to postdeprivation prison grievance remedy for alleged conversion of property
barred due process claim).
16. Thompson v. Housewright, 741 F.2d 213, 216 (8th Cir. 1984).
17. Id. at 214.
18. Ketchum v. City of West Memphis, 974 F.2d 81, 82 (8th Cir. 1992).
19. 741 F.2d at 215.
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witnesses.20 Arnold ordered that the prisoner be given the
whole transcript at the United States's expense.21
In the same year, Arnold overturned a district court's dis-
missal of another pro se prisoner's claim that police officers had
beaten him and seized his car without probable cause.22 This
appeal involved an interesting question as to whether a claim
that concededly could survive a motion to dismiss under Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) might still be dismissed under
the discretion granted by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) to refuse in forma
pauperis status for any frivolous or malicious claims.23 The dis-
trict court, after reading a state court file on a related case in-
volving the plaintiff, concluded that the facts he alleged in his
federal case were false, and proceeded to refuse in forma
pauperis status to the prisoner.24 Reversing that decision,
Judge Arnold held that no discretion existed under the in forma
pauperis law to dismiss a nonfrivolous claim for a poor defend-
ant that would have survived a § 12(b)(6) motion for a rich one:
There is no doubt that potential for abuse of the judicial system exists
in the practice of allowing persons to pursue claims without having to
pay related court costs. And it is true, as noted by the District Court,
thatpro se prisoner complaints filed in forma pauperis add to the work
of the courts. Still, the potential for abuse and the administrative bur-
den must be weighed against the right of every person to access to the
courts, and complaints may not be more lightly considered simply be-
cause the petitioner is poor, imprisoned, or acting for himself without a
lawyer.
25
The preceding passage may sound like commonplace rheto-
ric for judicial opinions; the uplifting aspect in this instance is
that Judge Arnold means it and practices it. Even when deny-
ing a prisoner relief on the merits, he has gone out of his way to
commend the appointed counsel in the opinion, in my experience
a practice far from common.
2 6
From time to time we call on lawyers to serve indigent clients, often
inmates of prisons, who have actions for damages or injunctive relief
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. A few lawyers complain about the imposition
20. Id.
21. Id. at 216.
22. Horsey v. Asher, 741 F.2d 209, 213 (8th Cir. 1984).
23. Id. at 211.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 212. Judge Arnold also declined to infer the requisite malice to
justify dismissal of the prisoner's case from the fact that the police officer de-
fendant had testified against the prisoner in the earlier trial. Id. at 212-13.
26. This judge once had the unsettling experience of having to persuade a
distinguished colleague not to sanction counsel, appointed in a criminal appeal,
for raising arguments the court found not to have merit.
19931
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on their time. Most do not. In fact, the vast majority of lawyers called
upon to render this kind of service do so competently and cheerfully,
and thus conduct themselves in the highest traditions of a bar that is
committed to public service. We try to reimburse appointed counsel for
their out-of-pocket expenses, using a fund derived from admissions
fees paid by members of our bar, but can of course pay no fees to law-
yers in civil cases, and they receive none, except in those instances,
rare as a practical matter, when their client prevails. We take this
opportunity to thank the bar in general, as well as counsel for plaintiff
in this particular case, for this exemplary service.
2 7
We hear much of the erosion of civility between bench and bar
these days. In his circuit, to that band of lawyers who are the
only, best hope of prisoners and other outcasts of society, Judge
Arnold provides a morale-boosting antidote.
B. FIRST AMENDMENT CLIMs
Fascinating First Amendment cases have crossed Judge Ar-
nold's path. I will discuss two here. In the first, McCurry v.
Tesch,28 evangelical church members sued the local sheriff,
among others, for storming into their church during a Monday
morning "prayer vigil," forcibly ejecting them and padlocking
the church.29 The deputies thought they were acting pursuant
to a state court judge's order, which they had interpreted as for-
bidding the use of the church except for scheduled religious serv-
ices on Saturday, Sunday, and Wednesday evenings, because
the church members had been operating an unauthorized school
on church premises. 30
Recognizing that the deputies' interpretation of the order
would be unconstitutional,3 1 Judge Arnold found a constitu-
tional interpretation in the preamble to the state judge's order
permitting in general terms the use of the church for religious
purposes.3 2 He explicitly rejected any notion that the worship-
pers should have to specially apply to the state court judge for
permission to hold services outside of scheduled times, or, if that
proved impossible, hold them elsewhere:
The right to worship free from governmental interference lies at the
heart of the First Amendment. It embraces not only the right to free
exercise of religion, but also the right to freedom of expression. The
27. Sims v. Wyrick, 743 F.2d 607, 611-12 (8th Cir. 1984). See also the pub-
lic thanks to counsel in Thompson v. Housewright, 741 F.2d 211, 216 (8th Cir.
1984).
28. 738 F.2d 271 (8th Cir. 1984).
29. Id. at 273.
30. Id. at 274.
31. Id. at 275.
32. Id.
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defendants' argument that these rights would not be burdened by an
order restricting the times that the plaintiffs could hold religious serv-
ices in the church to weekends and Wednesday evenings, because the
plaintiffs would be free to congregate and worship elsewhere, misses
the mark:" '[O]ne is not to have the exercise of his liberty of expression
in appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may-be exercised in
some other place.'" Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61,
76-77, 101 S. Ct. 2176, 2186-2187, 68 L.Ed.2d 671 (1981) (quoting
Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163, 60 S. Ct. 146, 151, 84 L.Ed. 155
(1939)). This principle applies with particular force to places, such as
church buildings, which have a special spiritual significance to the per-
sons who wish to worship there. ... It is no part of the business of
government in this country to decide when people may go to church.
The First Amendment protects prayer at six o'clock on Monday morn-
ing just as much as at eleven o'clock on Sunday morning.33
Arnold's narrower interpretation of the scope of the state court's
order stripped the deputies of any absolute immunity attaching
to execution of a court order and left them to the tender mercies
of qualified immunity as a defense to the section 1983 action. 34
In McCurry, Judge Arnold stood tall for freedom to pray
when and where worshippers choose, but the reader may detect
some deft footwork in the interpretation of the constitutionally
suspect state court order itself. Dissenting, Judge Fagg honed
in on this point. He found the terms of the state court order that
the sheriff secure the building on days other than Saturday,
Sunday and Wednesday evenings "explicit [and] clearly
stated";35 he accused Arnold of over-relying upon a generalized,
pre-order recital that suggested that the building would remain
open at such times as church services occurred.3 6 "It would be
anomalous for the court to punish obedient law enforcement of-
ficers by exposing them to civil damage liability based upon the
shortcomings of orders drafted by absolutely immunized state
judges," 37 he wrote.
Who had the right of it? Was it more accurate or even more
fair to put the officers to the test of interpreting an ambiguous
order (they might win on a qualified immunity defense, but
there was no guarantee) in order to indulge the presumption
that the state judge would not have issued an unconstitutional
order? Maybe, but not surely so. What was important about the
case-whether Judge Arnold or Judge Fagg was right on how
the order read-was its reaffirmation of the worshippers' unre-
33. Id. at 275-76.
34. Id. at 276.
35. Id. at 277 (Fagg, J., dissenting).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 278.
1993]
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served right of free exercise in their own church and on their
own time. Arnold's interpretation cautioned law enforcement of-
ficials to act carefully, although armed with a state court order,
when disrupting worship even by an unorthodox sect. That sig-
nal was an important one for civil liberties in the heartland.
The second case involving First Amendment rights featured
an extremely provocative issue of the student newspaper of the
University of Minnesota's Twin Cities campuses that satirized,
inter alia, Jesus Christ, the Roman Catholic Church, a variety of
ethnic groups, and public figures.38 In addressing these sub-
jects, the newspaper used scatological (though not obscene) lan-
guage and highlighted explicit and implicit references to sexual
acts.39 "There was, for example, a blasphemous 'interview' with
Jesus on the Cross that would offend anyone of good taste,
whether with or without religion." 40 The newspaper was subsi-
dized by compulsory student contributions.41 Predictably, the
university's regents heard from legislators and others sug-
gesting that objecting students henceforth be allowed to with-
draw their financial support of the newspaper if they did not like
its content.42 Over internal university objections, the regents
voted to refund such students' fees for a one year trial period,
thus reducing the financial support for the newspaper.43 The
district court judge thought that a rational, permissible reason
for the policy change existed, namely to assuage the concerns of
students who objected strongly to financing a paper they
abhorred.4
On appeal, a unanimous panel, with Judge Arnold writing,
assumed the presence and permissibility of such a motivation on
the part of the regents, but found it indisputable that another,
less permissible motivation-to suppress a recurrence of any-
thing like the issue in question-was also present in their deci-
sionmaking.45 In a "mixed motive" case, Judge Arnold said, the
university had to demonstrate that it would have acted in the
same way even if the impermissible motive were not present.46
But-and here lay the vigor and fearlessness of Judge Arnold's
38. Stanley v. Magrath, 719 F.2d 279, 280 (8th Cir. 1983).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 280-81.
43. Id. at 281-82 & n.4.
44. Id. at 281-82.
45. Id. at 283-84.
46. Id. at 283.
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ruling-the court would not remand for an inquiry into how the
regents would have acted, absent the impermissible motive, be-
cause the panel found it impossible on the record for any judge
properly to find that the impermissible motive of silencing the
students did not affect the decision.47 Regents' testimony and
the fact that the new funding policy did not affect controversial
papers on other university campuses would have rendered any
such contrary conclusion unacceptable. 48 The students won and
the panel remanded the case only for issuance of an appropriate
injunctive order to seal their victory.49 This result, too, one
must imagine, did not play that well in the Twin Cities. Yet
again Judge Arnold had displayed courage in a hostile setting.
Where constitutional rights are at stake, he resolutely faces the
hard questions.
II. RACE AND VOTING RIGHTS
In 1989, Judge Arnold authored a truly extraordinary vot-
ing rights opinion,50 calling into play virtually all the facets of
his wide-ranging career. Writing for a three-judge district court
with one member in partial dissent, he held that the 1981 appor-
tionment plan for the Arkansas House and Senate violated sec-
tion 2 of the Voting Rights Act.51 At the time of the challenge,
the districting plan had been in place for almost a decade, and
since only one more election in 1990 would take place before the
regular decennial reapportionment, the disruptive effect of deal-
ing with the current plan at all became a crucial issue in the
case on which the panel split.52 Judge Arnold had no difficulty
dispensing with that argument:
To the extent that electoral confusion and disruption exceed what they
would have been if the case had been filed earlier, we think that fair-
ness and equal opportunity in voting are worth it. We will not say to
these plaintiffs, "Wait for another census. The time is not yet ripe."
They have heard these words too many times in the past.
5 3
47. Id. at 284.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 285. Judge Arnold also rejected the Regents's claim of absolute
immunity because of their role as quasi-legislators: "The governing body of a
state supported institution of higher learning, we think, cannot qualify for such
protection. Such a rule would leave such bodies too free to violate the Constitu-
tion." Id.
50. Jeffers v. Clinton, 730 F. Supp. 196 (E.D. Ark. 1989), affd, 498 U.S.
1019 (1991).
51. Id. at 198.
52. Compare id. at 201-203 with id. at 219-26 (Eisele, C.J., dissenting).
53. Id. at 203.
1993]
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His panel took testimony for twelve days and "carefully con-
sidered the proof with due respect to the intensely practical na-
ture of the political process." 54 Its task was to decide if black
citizens in the Delta and certain other districts of Arkansas, in
the words of section 2, "have less opportunity than other mem-
bers of the electorate to elect representatives of their choice." 55
Arnold laid out the results of the 1981 redistricting plan plainly.
First, there were only five districts in which a majority of the
voting age population was black, even though sixteen relatively
compact and contiguous 56 black majority districts could have
been fashioned.57 Second, realistically, under the current plan,
there could be at most six black representatives in the 135-mem-
ber legislature in a state where blacks made up 16% of the popu-
lation.58 Moreover, race polarized voting in the areas in dispute
such that blacks almost always voted for blacks and whites for
whites.59 Before Judge Arnold could address whether these
facts demonstrated that blacks had less opportunity to "elect
representatives of their choice," he had to address the threshold
question of whether that was enough under section 2.60 The dis-
senter thought that deprivation of the opportunity to partici-
pate, specifically to vote, must also be shown as a reason for
distorted election results. 61 Arnold thought not, and dressed his
argument in golfers' garb:
[T]he argument fails purely as a logical and linguistic matter. Even if
plaintiffs failed to show less opportunity to participate in the political
process, a showing that they have less opportunity to elect candidates
of their choice would suffice to establish their claim. The right pro-
tected is the aggregate of these opportunities-the right to effective
participation in the political system: "[t]he essence of a § 2 claim is
that a certain electoral law, practice, or structure interacts with social
and historical conditions to cause an inequality in the opportunities
54. Id. at 198.
55. Id.
56. Judge Arnold did acknowledge that the alternative districting plan
would create some districts that "look rather strange," id. at 207, and would
contain "islands" that were completely surrounded by other districts. Id. The
propriety of relying on the fact that strangely-shaped districts could be formed,
as well as a good deal of the rest of voting rights jurisprudence, may be in ques-
tion after the Supreme Court's recent pronouncements. See Shaw v. Reno, 113
S. Ct. 2816 (1993) (holding that appellant stated a proper claim under the
Equal Protection Clause by alleging that the North Carolina General Assem-
bly's reapportionment plan was irrational on its face).
57. 730 F. Supp. at 198.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 230-31 (Eisele, C.J., concurring and dissenting).
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enjoyed by the black and white voters to elect their preferred repre-
sentatives." An example from a less exalted field of human endeavor
will illustrate the point. Suppose you say that I have less ability to
chip and putt than you do. If I am just as good a chipper as you are,
but not so good at putting, this statement, as a matter of ordinary
speech, is still a true one. It is a combination of qualities (play around
the green) that we are discussing, and the comparison is between our
respective totals or aggregates of these qualities. So in the context of
Section 2: it is a combination of abilities (abilities to use the elective
franchise) that we are comparing. If I can vote at will but never elect
anyone, my political ability is less than yours. Elections, and winning
them, are the whole point of voting. This is, at any rate, one reading of
the statute that is grammatically available, and the statute should be
construed liberally in favor of its object, which is to open up the electo-
ral process to full participation.6 2
Returning to the record before him, Arnold the golfer then
turned into Arnold the savvy politician and congressional aide.
"[W]e rely primarily on actual events and practical politics," he
said, to show that the "white voting majority is powerful
enough, and consistent enough, to defeat black voters' prefer-
ences for black candidates almost without exception."6 3 Since
1978, black candidates had lost ten races to white candidates in
white majority legislative districts and won none.64
White voters, in short, can elect white candidates against black opposi-
tion, but black voters cannot elect black candidates against white oppo-
sition, with insignificant exceptions. We hope the day will come when
this is no longer true, when voters of both races will vote for the person
and not for the color of his or her skin. Whatever distaste we may
personally have for racial stereotypes in politics, the relevant question
for present purposes is the preferences of voters in real life, and we
believe they have been clearly established.
65
Arnold followed up with a discussion of the relevant socio-
logical and economic differences among blacks and whites living
in the Arkansas Delta that reflected the effects of past discrimi-
nation and that "hinder[ed] their ability to participate effec-
tively in the political process." 66
If a person has no phone, cannot read, and does not own a car, the
ability to do almost everything in the modem world, including vote, is
severely curtailed .... [Als long as blacks, as a group, remain in a
depressed socio-economic status, their political power will necessarily
62. Id. at 204 (quoting Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 47 (1986)).
63. Id. at 208.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 209.
66. Id. at 209 (quoting S. REP. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 29, reprinted
in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 205.).
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be less, and the impact on them of vote-diluting boundary lines will be
greater.6
7
He reviewed as well modern-day instances of official discrimina-
tion in abruptly moving polling places, 68 appointing deputy vot-
ing registers only after litigation,6 9  intimidating black
candidates, 70 and a dearth of blacks elected to public offices gen-
erally in the state.71 No black person had ever won statewide
office 72 and black legislators had been elected exclusively from
black majority districts.73
On balance a clear answer emerges. In these areas, black political op-
portunity is significantly lessened by the 1981 apportionment plan,
and the plan violates Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.
74
Voting rights cases are difficult and messy. They have the
potential not only of cutting deep into state political processes,
but of exacerbating racial or ethnic tensions, simmering just be-
low the surface. The results they ask judges to reach are often
themselves quasi-political: whether past discrimination lingers
in present state policies and whether elected officials have been
responsive to the needs of minority groups. The remarkable
combination of historical, statistical, anecdotal, analytical, and
even experiential data Arnold used in this voting rights case
pays a stunning tribute to the reality of his background as a
practical politician. At one point, after discussing the method-
67. Id. at 211. The dissenting chief judge of the district court contested
this nexus. In his view, the residual efforts of past discrimination in employ-
ment, health care, and education could not qualify as lack of "opportunity" to
participate in the electoral process under section 2(b). Id. at 238 (Eisele, C.J.,
concurring and dissenting). Furthermore:
the assumed relevance of [the Senate Report] factors provides an es-
cape from the discipline imposed by the specific statutory language [of
section 2]. Once so liberated, the judges must rely on their own per-
sonal or even political philosophies. This can be dangerous business.
The temptation of judges to overly rely on their own "life experiences"
as personal values becomes difficult to resist.... Of course, each of the
three judges on this Court brings a lifetime of personal exposure to,
and involvement in, the political affairs of our state, but, as this case
demonstrates, we do not always come away from that exposure and
involvement with the same conclusions, views, ideas, and opinions.
Id. at 254.
68. Id. at 210.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 213.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 215. Judge Arnold found, however, that as to one of the areas in
dispute, Pulaski County, there was no section 2 violation, largely because repre-
sentatives of the local black community had endorsed the status quo. Id. at
216-17.
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ological debates between experts on both sides as to single re-
gression, double regression, and homogenous-precinct analysis,
as well as "scattergrams" plotting black/white votes in precincts,
Arnold concluded, not unreasonably, "To our untrained eye, the
cumulative effect of these exhibits is overwhelming, whatever
the technical merits or demerits of the various statistical theo-
ries. And our own experience as citizens of this State, which we
are not required to lay aside, strongly confirms this
conclusion." 75
Richard Arnold, the home state boy, could sniff out and
smoke out unjust discrimination in the most abstract record.
Even for one election, he believed that it was worth all the
trouble to make it right.76 As a result of the redistricting or-
dered by the court, for the first time in history, voters in Arkan-
sas elected a black state senator from the Delta region, and ten
new black senators and representatives to the state legislature
in the 1990 election.77
75. Id. at 208.
76. The Arkansas redistricting case is legendary. See Elaine R. Jones,
Broder v. Guinier, WASH. POST, June 20, 1993, at C7. The Arnold opinion dis-
cussed in text was summarily affirmed by the Supreme Court. See 498 U.S.
1019 (1991). It was followed by a second opinion adjudging that violations of
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments had been committed. See Jeffers v.
Clinton, 740 F. Supp. 585 (E.D. Ark. 1990), appeal dismissed, 498 U.S. 1129
(1991). Again, Judge Arnold wrote. He first held that before a court could order
a preclearance remedy (preclearance means that there must be advance federal
approval of future changes in state election laws and practices) under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973a(c) it had to find an intentional constitutional violation. Id. at 589. Ar-
nold found no such violation in the adoption of the 1981 apportionment scheme
itself but, rather, in other electoral practices that had been shown in the voting
rights case, principally the adoption of majority voting rules for general electo-
ral offices that had formerly required only a plurality vote. Id. at 589-95.
Devotion to majority rule for local offices lay dormant as long as the
plurality system produced white office-holders. But whenever black
candidates used this system successfully ... the response was swift
and certain. Laws were passed in an attempt to close off this avenue of
black political victory. This series of laws represents a systematic and
deliberate attempt to reduce black political opportunity. Such an at-
tempt is plainly unconstitutional. It replaces a system in which blacks
could and did succeed, with one in which they almost certainly cannot.
The inference of racial motivation is inescapable.
Id. at 594-95 (footnote omitted). Although he concluded that even when consti-
tutional violations were proven, a court retains equitable discretion not to order
preclearance, Arnold nevertheless ordered preclearance here for any majority
vote laws involving general elections. Id. at 599-602. A new redistricting plan
was approved with modifications in early 1990. See Jeffers v. Clinton, 756 F.
Supp. 1195 (E.D. Ark. 1990).
77. See Jones, supra note 76.
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III. WOMEN'S RIGHTS78
The decisions of Judge Arnold I have read-and I have tried
to review a faithful cross-section-have on the whole been dis-
tinctly sympathetic to women's claims of discrimination in the
workplace and in school. Thus, he ruled that a pro se woman
could state causes of action under Title VII,7 9 42 U.S.C. § 1981,
and 29 U.S.C. § 185 sufficient to withstand dismissal when she
claimed that because of her race and sex her union did not ade-
quately represent her in her grievance against her federal em-
ployer.80  More specifically, he overturned a finding of
untimeliness under Title VII and remanded for further factfind-
ing to see if the plaintiff had in fact been turned away by the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as she repre-
sented;81 said that Brown v. General Services Administration,82
which barred any action against a federal employer that could
have been brought under Title VII,8 3 did not preempt the plain-
tiffs section 1981 cause of action against her union;8 4 and sus-
tained the viability of her claim based on the union's failure to
represent her fairly.8 5
In an early sexual harassment case, he upheld a woman's
state law claims of wrongful discharge and intentional infliction
of emotional distress grounded in her foreman's requests that
she sleep with him.8 6 In assessing the wrongful discharge
claim, Judge Arnold found that Arkansas law recognized a pub-
lic policy exception to its employment at will doctrine, so that an
employee could base a contract claim on a dismissal caused by
her declination to break the law.87 He then went on to infer that
78. I could find only one age discrimination case authored by Judge Arnold.
In Dace v. ACF Industries, Inc., 722 F.2d 374 (8th Cir. 1983), he faced the
routine issue of whether the district judge should have rendered a directed
verdict before allowing the plaintiff to submit rebuttal evidence. Id. at 375.
After a characteristically careful review of the evidence, Arnold concluded that
it was not clear enough to support a directed verdict, so the case was remanded
to permit it to go to the jury. Id. at 379.
79. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988).
80. Jennings v. American Postal Workers Union, 672 F.2d 712, 714-15 (8th
Cir. 1982).
81. Id. at 715.
82. 425 U.S. 820 (1976).
83. Id. at 835.
84. 672 F.2d at 716.
85. Id.
86. Lucas v. Brown & Root, Inc., 736 F.2d 1202, 1205 (8th Cir. 1984). Her
Title VII claim was held to be untimely. Id. at 1203.
87. Id. at 1204-05.
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because Arkansas had a statute against prostitution,88 and a
"woman invited to trade herself for a job is in effect being asked
to become a prostitute,"8 9 an employer could not lawfully dis-
miss her for refusing to do what the law forbids.90 Judge Arnold
presented an ingenious rationale, for sure, but a self-limited one
that might not be extendible to cover harassments short of
sleep-over invitations, such as just plain hostile environment
claims. Still, this was 1984 and it was a start. In going even
that far in that remote pre-Thomas/Hill era, Judge Arnold again
showed his irrepressible streak of judicial realism and an admi-
rable willingness to state outright what we all know-that
judges do, and indeed must, make law:
Public policy is usually defined by the political branches of govern-
ment. Something "against public policy" is something that the Legis-
lature has forbidden. But the Legislature is not the only source of such
policy. In common-law jurisdictions the courts too have been sources of
law, always subject to legislative correction, and with progressively
less freedom as legislation occupies a given field. It is the courts, to
give one example, that originated the whole doctrine that certain kinds
of businesses-common carriers and innkeepers-must serve the pub-
lic without discrimination or preference. In this sense, then, courts
make law, and they have done so for centuries.9 1
In his very early years on the district court bench, Judge
Arnold decided an exotic gender discrimination case about
girls' basketball rules.92 Arkansas was one of only a few states
that still imposed special "half-court" playing rules on girls' jun-
ior and senior high school teams. 93 A fourteen year-old ninth-
grader brought suit on equal protection grounds.94 Despite the
state's argument that tradition and custom justified the differ-
ence,95 Arnold grasped immediately the importance of rule-
equality to the young players. The playing rules placed the
plaintiff and other female junior athletes at a severe disadvan-
tage, Arnold noted, if they wanted to play college basketball
(perhaps on scholarship), which used "full-court" rules. 96
Moreover,
Arkansas girls simply do not get the full benefit and experience of the
88. Id. at 1205.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Dodson v. Arkansas Activities Assoc., 468 F. Supp. 394 (E.D. Ark.
1979).
93. Id. at 397.
94. Id. at 395-96.
95. Id. at 398.
96. Id. at 396-97.
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game of basketball available to Arkansas boys.... A five-person, full-
court game requires a more comprehensive and more complex strategy.
It also provides more intensive physical training and conditioning, be-
cause, if for no other reason, players on a five-person team have to run
up and down the full length of the court, not just half of it.... Girls are
"learning half of the game."
97
As the state argued, "[hlalf-court may in fact be a better game.
But if it's better for the girls, it's better for the boys as well."98
In addition, "[s]imply doing things the way they've always been
done is not an 'important government objective,' if indeed it is a
legitimate objective at all .... [Tradition alone, without sup-
porting gender-related substantive reasons, cannot justify plac-
ing girls at a disadvantage for no reason other than their being
girls."9
9
In holding for the plaintiff, Arnold refused to follow a prior
case from an Oklahoma district court that had held against pro-
testing girls on the ground that their injury, in the great scheme
of things, was de minimis. 100
Jones [the contrary case] suggests ... that the injury to Oklahoma
girls is de minimis. It certainly is not de minimis to people who play
basketball, and a lot of people do.... This is not to say that basketball
is of equal dignity in the constitutional hierarchy with freedom of
speech and academic inquiry, or that athletics is as important to an
educational program as academics. This Court holds only that school
authorities, once having adopted the maxim mens sana in corpore
sano, must extend the benefits of physical training with a reasonably
even hand.1 0 1
Some women's groups have skeptically viewed Arnold's po-
sition in abortion cases. Except for perhaps one case, I think his
record stands up well as a defender of a woman's right to control
her body under the strictures of Roe v. Wade.10 2 He sat as a
member of the en banc court in Reproductive Health Service v.
Webster,103 in which Chief Judge Lay wrote for the court. The
majority decision, ultimately reversed by the Supreme Court, 1°4
held unconstitutional under Roe an array of Missouri restric-
tions on the availability of abortion. The restrictions included
requirements that abortions beyond the fifteenth week of preg-
97. Id. at 396 (citation omitted).
98. Id. at 397.
99. Id. at 398.
100. Id. at 398-99 (citing Jones v. Oklahoma Secondary Sch. Activities As-
soc., 453 F. Supp. 150 (W.D. Okla. 1977)).
101. Id. at 399.
102. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
103. 851 F.2d 1071 (8th Cir. 1988) (en banc), rev'd, 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
104. Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
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nancy be performed in a hospital, 05 that certain tests be used to
determine the viability of a fetus, 10 6 and the use of public facili-
ties or public employees to perform or assist abortions be prohib-
ited, even if no public funding was involved.' 0 7 Judge Arnold
concurred fully in all of these judgments.' 08 There was, how-
ever, one section of the Missouri law that proclaimed that life
begins at conception, that unborn children have predictable in-
terests in life, well-being and health, and that
the laws of this state shall be interpreted and construed to acknowl-
edge on behalf of the unborn child at every stage of development, all
the rights, privileges, and immunities available to other persons, citi-
zens, and residents of this state, subject only to the Constitution of the
United States, and decisional interpretations thereof by the United
States Supreme Court .... 1o9
The law defined "unborn children" to include all "offspring of
human beings from the moment of conception until birth.""10
The majority held the section unconstitutional under the
Supreme Court's decision in City of Akron v. Akron Center for
Reproductive Health, Inc.,"' which said that the "State may not
adopt one theory of when life begins to justify its regulation of
abortions." 11 2 The defendants argued that this law was abor-
tion-neutral because it exempted any contrary declarations by
the Supreme Court. 1 3 Chief Judge Lay pointed out that just
saying it did not make it so, since the declaration of personhood
as beginning at conception appeared in an abortion bill, and the
"only plausible inference is that the state intended its abortion
regulations to be understood against the backdrop of its theory
of life." "14
Judge Arnold's difference" i5 with the majority was confined
to the single point that the entire section on unborn children
need not be invalidated, although it could not constitutionally be
105. 851 F.2d at 1073-74.
106. Id. at 1074-75.
107. Id. at 1081-84.
108. Id. at 1084-85 (Arnold, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
109. Mo. Rav. STAT. § 1.205.1-.2 (1986).
110. Id. at § 1.205.3.
111. 462 U.S. 416 (1983), overruled by Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v.
Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
112. Id. at 444.
113. See Reproductive Health Serv. v. Webster, 851 F.2d 1071, 1076 (8th
Cir. 1988) (en banc), rev'd, 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
114. Id.
115. His entire dissent is only two columns long. Id. at 1084-85 (Arnold, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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applied to abortion.116 "Of course a governmental declaration
about when human life begins, insofar as it is used to justify
regulation of abortion, is unconstitutional. But I do not see why
[the Missouri law] should not be upheld insofar as it relates to
subjects other than abortions." 17 Arnold used as examples of
permissible applications actions based on wrongful death or in-
jury to a fetus (other than from the mother's neglect) or property
rights. 18 In sum, his singular point was that the section was
not facially invalid, but only as applied to abortion."39
His, I think, was a narrow difference from the majority and,
in what has become its most notorious aspect, in fact suggests
not the slightest ambivalence as to the fundamental validity of
Roe v. Wade.120 Chief Judge Lay may well have been right in
surmising that the motivation and even intent of the unborn
children section was that it would be applied to abortions, even
though, in terms, it specifically made constitutional law, as de-
clared by the Supreme Court, dispositive. Legislators, doctors,
116. Id. at 1085 (Arnold, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). For
the rest, he even concurred in the majority's conclusion that the counselling
portions, ultimately upheld by the Supreme Court in Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S.
Ct. 1759 (1991), were unconstitutional:
As to Part D(1), invalidating those portions of §§ 188.205, 188.210,
and 188.215 forbidding the use of public facilities, employees, or funds
to encourage or counsel certain abortions, I concur in the result. These
statutes sharply discriminate between kinds of speech on the basis of
their viewpoint: a physician, for example, could discourage an abor-
tion, or counsel against it, while in a public facility, but he or she could
not encourage or counsel in favor of it. That kind of distinction is flatly
inconsistent with the First Amendment, as incorporated against the
states by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
851 F.2d at 1085 (Arnold, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
117. Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
118. Id.
119. The Supreme Court held that it need not pass on the constitutionality
of the "unborn children" preamble to the statute because the circuit court ma-
jority had misconceived the effect of the dictum in Akron. Webster v. Reproduc-
tive Health Serv., 492 U.S. 490, 506 (1989). According to the Court, the
preamble could be interpreted to do no more than offer protection to the unborn
in tort and probate law, as Arnold suggested. See id. It might also be seen as
simply expressing a "value judgment." Id. The Court also found that the re-
strictions on use of public facilities and employees to perform abortions did not
contravene the Constitution, id. at 507-11; that the dispute over use of public
funds to encourage or counsel abortion had been intentionally mooted by the
plaintiffs, id. at 512-13; and that the tests for viability mentioned in the law
were optional at the doctor's choice, id. at 514 (plurality opinion); id. at 525
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); and, so inter-
preted, were constitutional. Id. at 519-20 (plurality opinion); id. at 530
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
120. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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unsophisticated judges, and, certainly, laypersons might not
pick up so subtle a reservation. But Arnold's countervailing con-
cern that state laws not be held facially unconstitutional if they
encompassed legitimate as well as illegitimate applications also
has strong roots in our law. 121 Even in dissent, orthodox femi-
nists must recognize that his position is in most respects far
more expansive than the present Supreme Court's. 122 Judge Ar-
nold's critics must play fair among all suspects in assessing al-
leged heresies.
Perhaps the most enigmatic of Judge Arnold's formidable
array of civil rights decisions is his opinion for the Eighth Cir-
cuit in United States Jaycees v. McClure,123 later reversed unan-
imously by the Supreme Court.124 Perhaps the best explanation
lies in Judge Arnold's own golfing motion-even at his peak,
Jack Nicholas had an off-day. Jaycees considered whether a
Minnesota law forbidding gender discrimination in a "place of
public accommodation" 125 could be enforced against the Na-
tional Jaycees, which had sanctioned their Twin Cities's chap-
ters for admitting women to full membership in defiance of the
Jaycees's national rules. 126 Judge Arnold, for a split panel with
Chief Judge Lay dissenting, found first that because the organi-
zation devoted a substantial part of its activities to the expres-
sion of social and political ideas, including controversial notions
such as voluntary prayer in the schools, it qualified for First
Amendment protection of the right of association. 27 He then
reasoned that regulating the grounds for membership would
121. See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987) ("A facial
challenge to a legislative Act is, of course, the most difficult to mount success-
fully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists
under which the Act would be valid.").
122. This may not be true in one respect, however. Judge Arnold joined an
en banc majority in holding constitutional a Minnesota statute requiring that
minors notify both parents at least forty-eight hours before receiving an abor-
tion or, alternatively, obtain court approval. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 853 F.2d
1452, 1453 (8th Cir. 1988). The majority felt that the Supreme Court's "ap-
proval [of] similar statutory plans mandates approval in this case," id. at 1459,
despite its "considerable questions about the practical wisdom of this statute."
Id. The dissenters thought that the Supreme Court precedent was distinguish-
able. Id. at 1467 (Lay, C.J., dissenting). The majority's decision was affirmed
in full by the Supreme Court. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 423 (1990).
123. 709 F.2d 1560 (8th Cir. 1983), rev'd sub nom. Roberts v. United States
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
124. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) (Burger, C.J. and
Blackmun, J., abstaining).
125. MINN. STAT. § 363.03 subd. 3 (1983).
126. 709 F.2d at 1561-63. See also 468 U.S. at 614 (describing sanctions).
127. 709 F.2d at 1569-70.
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deeply invade the organization's right to associate freely for the
purpose of expressing such views. 128 Finally, he thought that
the state's interest in eradicating gender discrimination was not
compelling enough to justify so deep a cut into the internal af-
fairs of a First Amendment organization, in part because alter-
native ways to accomplish the state interest existed, like
forbidding state employees to take part in the Jaycees or cutting
off any indirect state subsidies of Jaycee activities, such as a de-
duction for charitable contributions. 12 9 He also thought that the
Supreme Court of Minnesota's ruling that the Jaycees were a
"public" organization was not well-reasoned enough to pass
muster against a vagueness challenge: it failed to delineate
clearly the difference between public and private organizations,
leading to the puzzling result that the Kiwanis Club was "pri-
vate" while the Jaycees was "public." 130 In sum, Judge Arnold
reasoned that "if, in the phrase of Justice Holmes, the First
Amendment protects 'the thought that we hate,' it must also, on
occasion, protect the association of which we disapprove."
13
'
Arnold's conclusion seems driven by his view that although
this was not a "private" club in the classic sense, neither was it a
classic "public" club because it engaged in First Amendment ex-
pressions that went far beyond commercial speech.132 He did
not fail to recognize the right to associate freely, but in the view
of dissenting Chief Judge Lay,133 and ultimately the Supreme
Court,' 3 4 he underestimated the force of the state's interest in
regulating that right to limit gender discrimination. He ap-
peared to assume that the core freedom of expression would
somehow be impinged by a requirement of gender neutrality in
membership.' 35 That might be arguable if a select group of men
banded together to fight the Equal Rights Amendment, but a
national organization that unselectively solicited dues-paying
male members between eighteen and thirty-five and opened its
programs and benefits to associate women members136 would be
128. Id. at 1571-72.
129. Id. at 1572-74.
130. Id. at 1576-78.
131. Id. at 1561.
132. Id. at 1576 ("We are not in the less well protected area of commercial
speech.").
133. Id. at 1581 (Lay, C.J., dissenting).
134. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984).
135. 709 F.2d at 1571 ("It is natural to expect that an association containing
both men and women will not be so single-minded about advancing men's inter-
ests as an association of men only.").
136. 468 U.S. at 613, 627.
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hard-pressed to make out the case.
Chief Judge Lay thought that at the heart of his colleague's
opinion was a fundamental disagreement with the Minnesota
Supreme Court's inclusion of the Jaycees as a "place of public
accommodation." 137 He objected as well to Arnold's notion that
inclusion of women in membership might affect the ideological
positions of the organization: "The activities the Jaycees engage
in have no relationship to its internal membership practices; an
association of men with privileges superior to women does not
enhance the effectiveness of the type of advocacy the group has
undertaken."' 38
The Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Justice Bren-
nan (for whom Judge Arnold had clerked many years before),
found that the Jaycees did not warrant the kind of protection
reserved for intimate associations like the family:
In short, the local chapters of the Jaycees are neither small nor
selective. Moreover, much of the activity central to the formation and
maintenance of the association involves the participation of strangers
to that relationship. Accordingly, we conclude that the Jaycees chap-
ters lack the distinctive characteristics that might afford constitutional
protection [under an "intimate association" theory] to the decision of
its members to exclude women. 13
9
Justice Brennan then turned to the line of cases protecting
"expressive associations," and declared that, although the Min-
nesota statute did impinge on the Jaycees's ability to express its
137. 709 F.2d at 1579 (Lay, C.J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 1580. Judge Heaney, dissenting from denial of rehearing en
banc, presaged the Justice O'Connor concurrence in the Supreme Court. See
Roberts, 468 U.S. at 639-40 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment). He saw the Jaycees as primarily a business-gathering, network-
ing organization from which young women were being unfairly excluded:
Young women are entitled to share in the good jobs in our society
according to their abilities. They will not share fully in these jobs,
however, as long as young men are exclusively eligible for membership
in the "right business organization," which gives them an edge in hir-
ing for and promotion to leadership positions. To be sure, the Jaycees
sponsor many social activities and events. They also take positions on
some of the great issues of our time. But these activities are not cen-
tral to their purpose. The central purpose is rather to learn the tech-
niques and skills and to form the acquaintances that will serve as a
basis for leadership positions today and tomorrow.
Young men have the right to associate with whomever they please,
but under Minnesota law they should not be able to form an organiza-
tion that is primarily business oriented and exclude young women from
that organization when the effect of that exclusion is to deprive the
latter of an equal opportunity for leadership positions.
Jaycees, 709 F.2d at 1583 (Heaney, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en
banc).
139. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 621.
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views by interfering with its internal organization, infringe-
ments of the right of expressive association can be countenanced
for compelling reasons; wiping out gender discrimination was
more compelling than Judge Arnold had recognized. 140 Judge
Arnold, in defense of one freedom, had, at least in the Supreme
Court's view, underestimated the importance to society of an-
other freedom-freedom from discrimination on the basis of gen-
der in public groups, even those that engage in advocacy.
Why did a judge so quick to see the diminished future of a
young athlete forced to play by "girls' rules" find it acceptable to
bar young professional women from such an important business
and social networking group as the Jaycees? The best answer I
can surmise (beyond the golfing analogy I have suggested) is
that in the one case he was dealing with a game, in the other,
with a constitutional right. For recognition of the rights at
stake, he gets an A; for balancing, he gets a B-.
The final stop on our excursion is a recent and, I believe,
quite revealing dissent by Judge Arnold 141 in what might at first
seem to be a minor case but which turns out to illustrate Ar-
nold's continuing strengths in the civil rights area: his ability to
identify and stand up for constitutional rights in situations
others would dismiss as unworthy of constitutional explication.
We saw it before in the case of the transient forced to cross the
bridge, 142 and again, as we shall see, in the desire of a new
mother to pick out her baby's surname. 143 We also see his lack
of timidity in probing for constitutional ground in the much-
maligned right to privacy. It is my gut feeling and prediction
that these characteristics will mature and flourish as his stint
on the bench lengthens. In the final opinion I discuss, Arnold
again displays to advantage his trenchant writing style' 44 and
his lack of reticence in drawing on his own experiences and reac-
140. Id. at 623.
141. Henne v. Wright, 904 F.2d 1208, 1216 (8th Cir. 1990) (Arnold, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1032 (1991).
142. See supra notes 6-15 and accompanying text.
143. Henne, 904 F.2d at 1216-17.
144. The following passage is typical:
A few salient facts are worth repeating. Debra Henne wants to give
her daughter the surname of the little girl's father. The father is will-
ing. He has acknowledged his fatherhood. The man to whom Ms.
Henne was married when the baby was born has no objection. Linda
Spidell wants to name her daughter "McKenzie," which is neither her
name nor the name of the child's father. The choice is not so eccentric
as it seems, however: Ms. Spidell's two other children are named "Mc-
Kenzie," and it is quite natural to desire that all of one's three children
have the same surname. Again, no one with a personal interest ob-
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tions, not to justify results but to reaffirm (or even contradict)
the references and arguments of those who appear before him.
In Henne v. Wright,145 the Eighth Circuit considered
whether a Nebraska law infringed a new mother's constitutional
right to privacy because it would not allow her to pick a surname
for her baby which had no legally established connection with
the child. 146 One of the plaintiff mothers, although married to
another man at the time of the child's birth, wished to give her
child the surname of its real father, who had acknowledged, but
not obtained, a judicial declaration of paternity.147 None of the
parties objected to giving the child the real father's surname.148
The district court had held that a woman's right to privacy in-
cludes naming her child, 149 but the circuit court reversed, find-
ing that a right to give a child a name with which the child has
no legally established connection was not deeply rooted in Amer-
ican history and tradition:
The custom in this country has always been that a child born in
lawful wedlock receives the surname of the father at birth, and that a
child born out of wedlock receives the surname of the mother at birth.
While some married parents now may wish to give their children
the surname of the mother or a hyphenated surname consisting of both
parents' surname, and some unmarried mothers may wish to give their
children the surname of the father, we can find no American tradition
to support the extension of the right of privacy to cover the right of a
parent to give a child a surname with which that child has no legally
recognized parental connection. Plaintiffs therefore have not asserted
a right that is fundamental under the fourteenth amendment right of
privacy .... 150
Judge Arnold in dissent took quite a different view of the
case: "The fundamental right of privacy, in my view, includes
the right of parents to name their own children, and the State
has shown no interest on the facts of these cases sufficiently
compelling to override that right."1 15
Acknowledging that the case might have been, but was not,
jects. Ray Duffer, the man who lives with Ms. Spidell, is the child's
father, and "McKenzie" is fine with him.
Id. at 1216.
145. 904 F.2d 1208 (8th Cir. 1990).
146. Id. at 1212-13 n.5.
147. Id. at 1210.
148. Id. at 1216 (Arnold, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
149. Henne v. Wright, 711 F. Supp. 511, 513 (D. Neb. 1989), rev'd, 904 F.2d
1208 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1032 (1991).
150. 904 F.2d at 1214-15 (citations omitted).
151. Id. at 1216 (Arnold, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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pleaded on First Amendment grounds,152 and that finding such
a right as an aspect of the right of privacy was "trickier
ground,"153 he went on:
The right of privacy is not the beneficiary of explicit textual protection
in the federal Constitution. It is an unenumerated right. There are
such things in constitutional law, however.... People existed, and had
rights, before there was such a thing as government. Government
might protect or recognize rights, but rights, some of them anyway,
existed before government and independently of it, and would continue
to exist after government had been destroyed. The source of rights was
not the State, but, as the Declaration of Independence put it, the
"Creator".
The real question is not whether there is a right to privacy.., but
how do you tell what it includes?... The right to name one's child
seems to me, if anything, more personal and intimate, less likely to
affect people outside the family, than the right to send the child to a
private school or have the child learn German. We know, moreover,
from Roe v. Wade that these women had a fundamental right to pre-
vent their children from being born in the first place. It is a bizarre
rule of law indeed that says they cannot name the children once they
are born. If there was ever a case of the greater including the less, this
ought to be it.
... A person's name is, in a sense, her identity, her personality,
her being.... There is something sacred about a name. It is our own
business, not the government's.' *
Arnold then conducted a foray into the history of surnames
to discern what the custom and tradition really was, and con-
cluded that names were not always inherited and early tradition
did not restrict the choice of a surname.15 5 Unlike the majority
which focussed on whether there is any tradition supporting the
specific right claimed here, Arnold asked whether there is any
solid tradition of legislation denying such a right.'56 In the ab-
sence of tradition either way on that more narrow question, he
suggested we look to the tradition we do have. "People may
choose or change their own names without leave of government.
It is only a small step to extend the same right to their children's
names. Children are, during infancy anyway, simply legal ex-
152. Id. ("What I call myself or my child is an aspect of speech.").
153. Id.
154. Id. at 1216-17 (citations omitted).
155. Id. at 1218. Pointing out that older authorities on names refer only to
fathers and sons, Judge Arnold said: "I take it everyone would concede today
that mothers, daughters, and women in general are legally entitled to the bene-
fit of whatever tradition was formerly expressed in male terms." Id. at 1218
n.2.
156. Id. at 1218-19.
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tensions of their parents for many purposes." 157
The Henne dissent suggests the present stance of Judge Ar-
nold: a judge growing steadily in stature, a strong and plain-
spoken judge sensitive to the needs of ordinary people and not
afraid to recognize and declare basic rights to protect their most
basic needs, even if those rights are not specifically enumerated
in the Constitution. Most of us, at this stage of our careers,
could not ask for a nobler interim epitaph.
157. Id. at 1219.
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